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Keeping up with (which) Joneses: a critique of constitutional
comparativism in Hong Kong and its implications for
rights development
Phil C.W. Chan!
Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, Singapore
This paper explores Hong Kong courts’ recourse to foreign and international legal
materials in the interpretation of the two most important rights instruments governing
Hong Kong, the Basic Law of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights
Ordinance, both generally and in two specific cases concerning freedom of expression
and the age of consent for male/male sexual activity. It discusses how Hong Kong
courts within the confines of political realities continue to allow themselves to be
overridden by foreign courts in matters concerning Hong Kong. Constitutional
comparativism as has been practised in Hong Kong, this paper argues, merely serves
to allow for and perpetuate unpredictable judicial reasoning and the lingering effects
of Hong Kong’s colonial past, and is in need of a consistent and reasoned approach
for its legitimate application and, ultimately, the protection of human rights, including
sexual minority rights, and the rule of law in Hong Kong.
Keywords: Hong Kong; constitutional comparativism; human rights; rule of law; law
and development; legitimacy
Introduction
Those outside Hong Kong often wonder whether and how much the political, socio-
economic and cultural landscape of Hong Kong has changed since its return to Chinese
sovereignty after 155 years of British colonial rule. China’s resumption of sovereignty,
they generally believe, must have resulted in some negative outcomes for Hong Kong, and
if Hong Kong had remained under British colonial rule the city would have been better off.
However, what the people of Hong Kong ought to ask is whether they finally have a
definitive say, as permitted by the confines of political realities, in matters concerning
Hong Kong or in fact continue to allow themselves to be overridden by what other
people think is best. As a legal scholar, I must leave the complex task of analysing the pol-
itical, socio-economic and cultural effects of China’s resumption of sovereignty to political
scientists, economists, and cultural anthropologists. Instead, this paper explores Hong Kong
courts’ recourse to foreign and international legal materials in the interpretation of the two
most important rights instruments governing Hong Kong: the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as
the Basic Law of Hong Kong), promulgated in 1990 by China’s National People’s Congress
as a Chinese national law under Article 31 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of
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China in pursuance of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration,1 and the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights Ordinance, enacted in June 1991 by Hong Kong’s colonial legislature in response to
the Tiananmen Massacre in Beijing in June 1989. The two rights instruments have since
become the core of Hong Kong’s public law persona where the development of its own
identity and destiny lies.
In his keynote address to the annual meeting of the American Society of International
Law in 2003, United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer referred to his
colleague Justice Ruth Ginsburg as she stated extra-judicially that ‘comparative analysis
emphatically is relevant to the task of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human
rights’.2 However, does constitutional comparativism in post-colonial Hong Kong merely
serve to allow for and perpetuate the lingering effects of Hong Kong’s colonial past?
Indeed, Wiktor Osiatynski asks, ‘is the continuation of a model of the former colonial
power synonymous with borrowing?’3 As Roger Alford explains, comparative law
concerns the central development of a constitutional theory in a particular jurisdiction
with comparativism as an interpretive paradigm.4 ‘The legitimacy of constitutional
comparativism’, Alford argues, ‘should be determined by constitutional theory. Compara-
tivism is not a constitutional theory; it is a methodology that is employed depending on a
judge’s particular theory.’5
Thus, this paper first explores the debate within the Hong Kong judiciary (including the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council up to 30 June 1997) on whether, why and how to
approach foreign and international legal materials in the interpretation of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance (from June 1991) and the Basic Law of Hong Kong (from July
1997). It then examines two specific Hong Kong human rights cases: Ng Kung Siu v.
HKSAR,6 which concerned the criminalisation of desecration of the Chinese national and
Hong Kong regional flags in Hong Kong within the confines of freedom of expression,
and Leung T.C. William Roy v. Secretary for Justice,7 which concerned the higher age of
consent for male/male sexual activity in the light of an individual’s right of equality and
his right to privacy. The two decisions are chosen as they illustrate how constitutional com-
parativism as has been practised in Hong Kong may be capable of both undermining and
augmenting the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Basic
Law of Hong Kong and the Ordinance, and in both instances the Hong Kong courts’
approaches were problematic. Constitutional comparativism as has been practised in
Hong Kong, this paper argues, is in need of a consistent and reasoned approach for its
legitimate application and, ultimately, the protection of human rights, including sexual
minority rights, and the rule of law in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong courts’ general approaches to constitutional comparativism
A constitution, as the grundnorm of a polity, ought to be the embodiment of the polity’s
values, beliefs, and self-identification. As a legally binding instrument consisting of
norms antecedent to and governing the polity, a constitution both empowers and constrains
the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. A constitution, furthermore,
enshrines and preserves the political compromises leading to its promulgation.
While the Basic Law of Hong Kong was imposed upon Hong Kong under an agreement
between the United Kingdom and China and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance was
enacted by Hong Kong’s colonial legislature, the two rights instruments seek to enshrine,
guarantee and protect the interests of Hong Kong and its people within the confines of
political realities, and a study of constitutional comparativism in Hong Kong will be an
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immediate misadventure if it is not informed by an understanding of the two instruments.
The Preamble to the Basic Law of Hong Kong, first and foremost, states:
Upholding national unity and territorial integrity, maintaining the prosperity and stability of
Hong Kong, and taking account of its history and realities, the People’s Republic of China
has decided that upon China’s resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong, a
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be established in accordance with the
provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, and that
under the principle of ‘one country, two systems’, the socialist system and policies will not
be practised in Hong Kong.8
The substantive provisions of the Basic Law of Hong Kong then provide the following
general safeguards for the autonomy of post-colonial Hong Kong:
(1) Hong Kong is authorised ‘to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy
executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication’.9
(2) The socialist system and policies practised in China will not extend to post-colonial
Hong Kong, whose ‘previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain
unchanged for 50 years’.10
(3) ‘The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of
equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained,
except for any that contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the
legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.’11
(4) In addition to Chinese, English may be used as an official language by the three
branches of government in Hong Kong.12
In addition, the Basic Law of Hong Kong indicates and guarantees in 18 separate provisions
such fundamental rights and freedoms as may continue to be enjoyed in Hong Kong as of 1
July 1997.13 Article 39 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong, in particular, guarantees the contin-
ued application in post-colonial Hong Kong of the International Covenant on Civil and Pol-
itical Rights (ICCPR),14 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,15 and International Labour Organisation conventions previously applicable.16 The
Basic Law of Hong Kong also establishes a Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, replacing
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as of 1 July 1997 as the court of final resort
for Hong Kong.17 The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, which may recruit judges from
other common law jurisdictions,18 is vested with the power of final adjudication.19
However, in cases involving the interpretation of the Basic Law of Hong Kong concerning
‘affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People’s Government, or concerning the
relationship between the Central Authorities and [Hong Kong], and if such interpretation
will affect the judgments on the cases, the courts of [Hong Kong] shall, before making
their final judgments which are not appealable, seek an interpretation of the relevant
provisions from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress’.20
As will be seen, the debate within the Hong Kong judiciary about the correct approach in
the interpretation of the two rights instruments has, however, lain to a lesser extent with the
Basic Law of Hong Kong than with the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, as the Basic
Law of Hong Kong was not in force until 1 July 1997 and the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, the court of final resort for Hong Kong up to 30 June 1997, played a
pivotal role in the debate, which soon became settled as the Hong Kong Court of Final
Appeal assumed the role of the Judicial Committee and pronounced its opinion on the matter.
The International Journal of Human Rights 309
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The Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance is the municipal legislation implementing the
ICCPR in Hong Kong and its substantive rights provisions are closely modelled upon
those of the Covenant. Section 2(3) of the Ordinance stated that in ‘interpreting and
applying this Ordinance, regard shall be had to the fact that the purpose of this Ordinance
is to provide for the incorporation into the law of Hong Kong of provisions of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’.21 Yash Ghai maintains that the provision
was ‘undoubtedly an invitation to the judiciary to consider the interpretations of the ICCPR
by the Human Rights Committee as well as of other international bodies dealing with
analogous provisions. This internationalises the rights issue in a manner which upsets
China, which prefers to see rights as determined by the specific historical and economic
circumstances of a particular state.’22 Thus, it was not surprising that section 2(3), together
with three other provisions of the Ordinance, was specifically not adopted by the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress on 23 February 1997 as part of the law of
Hong Kong as of 1 July 1997 in accordance with Article 160 of the Basic Law of Hong
Kong.23 The reason for the Standing Committee’s refusal to adopt the provisions probably
lay in China’s unease with international human rights law and the ICCPR having an explicit
direct effect on the interpretation and application of a domestic law, that is, the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance and consequently all domestic laws of Hong Kong. Ghai, Peter
Wesley-Smith, and Johannes Chan all argue that the Standing Committee’s refusal never-
theless had no legal effect on the continuing operation of the ICCPR, as judges may rely
on the preamble, long title and substantive provisions of the Ordinance all of which
make reference to the ICCPR and its incorporation into the law of Hong Kong.24 Chan
further argues that the repeal of any statutory provision found to be inconsistent with the
Ordinance took effect on the commencement of the Ordinance, that is, 8 June 1991, and
it matters neither when the impugned statutory provision was enacted nor when the incon-
sistency was discovered: any such impugned statutory provision cannot be ‘laws previously
in force in Hong Kong’ under Article 8 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong and thus cannot
have been adopted as part of the law of Hong Kong as of 1 July 1997.25
It must be pointed out, however, that neither the United Kingdom government nor Hong
Kong’s colonial government desired a bill of rights in Hong Kong but for the Tiananmen
Massacre in Beijing in 198926 which caused public and foreign investors’ confidence in
the Hong Kong government and the future of Hong Kong to sink ‘to an all-time low’27
as well as an influx of emigration and outflow of capital from Hong Kong. Meanwhile,
the Chinese government opposed a bill of rights in Hong Kong as it considered the
Basic Law of Hong Kong to be sufficient to protect the rights the ICCPR guarantees.
According to Ghai, ‘China interprets the expression as “applied to Hong Kong” [in
Article 39 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong] to mean as already provided for under domestic
law, a stance which the Chinese claim Britain earlier promoted as a way to persuade it to
include the ICCPR in the Joint Declaration.’28 While the Chinese government refrained
from refusing to adopt the Bill in toto as part of the law of Hong Kong as of 1 July
1997, it did refuse to adopt certain provisions of the Ordinance which expressly incorpor-
ated the ICCPR into the law of Hong Kong, as has been noted.29
In any case, did the Hong Kong judiciary take up the invitation Ghai saw before it was
too late? In R. v. Sin Yau-ming,30 Hong Kong Court of Appeal Vice-President Silke
observed that ‘the glass through which we view the interpretation of the Hong Kong Bill
is a glass provided by the Covenant. We are no longer guided by the ordinary canons of
constructions of statutes nor with the dicta of the common law inherent in our training.
We must look, in our interpretation of the Hong Kong Bill, at the aims of the Covenant
and give “full recognition and effect” to the statement which commences that Covenant.’31
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His Lordship suggested the sources of law that Hong Kong courts should refer to when
interpreting the Ordinance:
While this court is, in effect, required to make new Hong Kong law relating to the manner of
interpretation of the Hong Kong Bill and consequentially the tests to be applied to those laws
now existing and, when asked, those laws yet to be enacted, we are not without guidance in our
task. This can be derived from decisions taken in common law jurisdictions which contain a
constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights. We can also be guided by decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights . . . and the European Human Rights Commission . . . Further, we can
bear in mind the comments and decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee . . . I
would hold none of these to be binding upon us though in so far as they reflect the interpretation
of articles in the Covenant, and are directly related to Hong Kong legislation, I would consider
them as of the greatest assistance and give to them considerable weight.32
The two-stage approach of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.Oakes33 to interpreting the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms34 then became the yardstick for Hong Kong
courts in their interpretation of the Ordinance when determining if a particular statutory
provision conflicted with it. Its impact on Hong Kong jurisprudence warrants that it be
quoted in detail:
Two central criteria must be satisfied to establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society. First, the objective to be served by the measures
limiting a Charter right must be sufficiently important to warrant overriding a constitutionally
protected right or freedom. The standard must be high to ensure that trivial objectives or those
discordant with the principles of a free and democratic society do not gain protection. At a
minimum, an objective must relate to societal concerns which are pressing and substantial in
a free and democratic society before it can be characterized as sufficiently important.
Second, the party invoking s.1 must show the means to be reasonable and demonstrably
justified. This involves a form of proportionality test involving three important components.
To begin, the measures must be fair and not arbitrary, carefully designed to achieve the
objective in question and rationally connected to that objective. In addition, the means
should impair the right in question as little as possible. Lastly, there must be a proportionality
between the effects of the limiting measure and the objective – the more severe the deleterious
effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be.35
Nevertheless, as Ghai notes, while both enshrine and guarantee certain fundamental rights
and freedoms, the Ordinance and the Charter also share marked dissimilarity:36 the Ordi-
nance does not have a general limitation clause, unlike the Charter that contains a notwith-
standing clause37 that the Canadian federal or provincial legislatures may invoke to override
a judgment dispositive of the issue. There is also no reference in the Ordinance to a ‘free and
democratic society’ as there is in the Charter38 from which the Supreme Court of Canada
deduced the Oaks approach to give effect to the Charter’s ‘overarching values and pur-
poses’,39 and which, with universal suffrage continuing to be wanting in Hong Kong,40
simply cannot be analogised to apply in Hong Kong.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, however, took issue with Hong Kong
courts referring to foreign and international legal materials (save, of course, English legal
materials). In Attorney General of Hong Kong v. Lee Kwong-kut,41 Lord Woolf insisted
that Hong Kong courts ought to abandon the Oakes approach and instead determine the
question of inconsistency between a statutory provision and the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights Ordinance through literal examination of the statutory provision alone. A too gener-
ous approach to the interpretation of the Ordinance, His Lordship surmised, would only
lead to injustice:
The International Journal of Human Rights 311
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While the Hong Kong judiciary should be zealous in upholding an individual’s rights under the
Hong Kong Bill, it is also necessary to ensure that disputes as to the effect of the Bill are not
allowed to get out of hand. The issues involving the Hong Kong Bill should be approached
with realism and good sense, and kept in proportion. If this is not done the Bill will become
a source of injustice rather than justice and it will be debased in the eyes of the public. In
order to maintain the balance between the individual and the society as a whole, rigid and
inflexible standards should not be imposed on the legislature’s attempts to resolve the difficult
and intransigent problems with which society is faced when seeking to deal with serious crime.
It must be remembered that questions of policy remain primarily the responsibility of the
legislature.42
Following Lord Woolf’s demand for judicial restraint, Hong Kong courts’ receptiveness
to foreign and international legal materials notably subsided. In Kwan Kong Company
Limited v. Town Planning Board,43 Hong Kong High Court Justice Waung held that in
interpreting the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, recourse to foreign and international
legal materials ought to be avoided if possible, as ‘other domestic and international instru-
ments are the product of very different circumstances and situations’,44 and common law
rules of interpretation would suffice:
From the judgments of Attorney General v. Lee Kwong-Kut and Ex parte Lee Kwok Hung,45 I
can detect the common law asserting its good sense requiring that proper interpretation of the
human rights Articles in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights . . . be subjected to the common law
rules of interpretation with its concentration on the text of the statute rather than by resorting
to the complex, uncertain and huge volumes on foreign jurisprudence importing in the guise of
‘autonomous meanings’ foreign concepts which run contrary to the normal meaning of words
under a Hong Kong statute.46
Recourse to European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) jurisprudence, according to
Justice Waung, was particularly inappropriate, for ‘[i]n Hong Kong, with our common law
tradition and our special eastern situations, we are not equipped to properly understand,
appreciate, analyze, apply or develop this foreign jurisprudence’,47 and ‘unless something
overwhelming and compelling can be shown in any particular European authority, the Hong
Kong Court should very wisely decline to be seduced by the seemingly inexhaustible
literature from the European Court of Human Rights’.48 It should be noted, however,
that Justice Waung’s view that the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance was not a quasi-
constitutional instrument and should not be given a generous interpretation was rejected
on appeal.49
Interestingly, inMing Pao Newspapers v. Attorney General of Hong Kong50 which was
adjudicated during the same period, both the Hong Kong Court of Appeal and the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council made use of ECHR jurisprudence. In particular, the
Judicial Committee invoked the doctrine of margin of appreciation, found only in ECHR
jurisprudence, to justify deference to Hong Kong’s legislature; Lord Jauncey stated:
The position is accordingly this. First, the Legislative Council has decided that notwith-
standing the provisions of the Bill s.30(1) is necessary to preserve the integrity of
investigations into corruption. This is a policy decision that cannot be described as ‘so
unreasonable as to be outside the State’s margin of appreciation’ (James v. United
Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123 at 154). Indeed, it appears to their Lordships to be a decision
which was eminently sensible and by no means disproportionate to the important objectives
sought to be achieved. Secondly, the court with its knowledge of local conditions in Hong
Kong has endorsed the decision. In these circumstances their Lordships could see no reason
to interfere.51
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As Chan points out, the Judicial Committee’s recourse to the doctrine of margin of
appreciation was inappropriate, as the doctrine developed in response to the fact that the
(currently) 47 Council of Europe members states have among them differing legal, political,
economic, social and cultural conditions and their national legislatures should be able to
formulate policies without heavy scrutiny by the European Court of Human Rights on
which members states confer jurisdiction and powers through ratification of and continued
participation in the ECHR.52 The doctrine ‘is not apposite in the domestic context of a
particular State’.53 Furthermore, the margin varies depending on the particular circum-
stances of the case and the Strasbourg court retains the ultimate supervisory role regarding
compatibility with the ECHR54 by which Hong Kong has never been bound. How such a
purely European doctrine can be extrapolated into Hong Kong was left unexplained by the
Judicial Committee.
Finally, as it assumed the role of the Judicial Committee in Hong Kong as of 1 July
1997, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal pronounced its opinion on whether consti-
tutional comparativism was acceptable in post-colonial Hong Kong in Tang Siu Man
v. HKSAR:55 Justice Bokhary, while acknowledging that decisions of the House of Lords
ceased to have binding authority over Hong Kong courts as of 1 July 1997,56 stated that
if the reasoning of a particular decision of the House was cogent then it ought to be fol-
lowed, as in order to ‘develop our own jurisprudence to greatest advantage, it is appropriate
for us to tap the best available wisdom of other jurisdictions’.57 His Lordship also indicated
that decisions from other common law jurisdictions were of persuasive authority as Hong
Kong courts adjudicated cases.58 In Ng Ka Ling and others v. Director of Immigration,59
Chief Justice Li stated that the Basic Law of Hong Kong ‘is an entrenched constitutional
instrument to implement the unique principle of “one country, two systems”. As is usual
for constitutional instruments, it uses ample and general language. It is a living instrument
intended to meet changing needs and circumstances.’60
Hong Kong courts’ approaches to constitutional comparativism in specific cases
The fact that the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal has stamped its seal of approval on con-
stitutional comparativism in Hong Kong nevertheless does not resolve the fundamental
question of whether Hong Kong courts’ recourse to foreign and international legal materials
in the interpretation of the Basic Law of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights
Ordinance is consistent, principled and, ultimately, legitimate. In other words, is it possible
that Lord Woolf and Justice Waung may have been correct in rejecting such recourse in the
interpretation of Hong Kong laws?
Most English laws and judicial decisions were adapted or followed in Hong Kong
before July 1997. In two separate surveys, Wesley-Smith finds that both between 1974
and 1983 and between 1972 and 1997, approximately 74% of cases cited by Hong Kong
courts were English cases while 20% were Hong Kong cases.61 The signing of the Sino-
British Joint Declaration in 1984, the enactment of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance
in 1991 and the impending handover of sovereignty in 1997 little moved the attitudes of the
judiciary and the legal profession on the question of what constituted laws of Hong Kong
as they continued to rely heavily on English judicial decisions.62 Indeed, the practice of
following English judicial decisions has since been endorsed by the Hong Kong Court of
Final Appeal.63 Recourse to judicial decisions from Western common law jurisdictions
such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, as well as decisions of
bodies established under an international or regional agreement such as the United Nations
Human Rights Committee64 and the European Court of Human Rights,65 also has continued.
The International Journal of Human Rights 313
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However, in so doing Hong Kong courts generally do not take cognisance of the
circumstances or the ratio decidendi of, or the constitutional or legislative framework
governing, the particular foreign case and, ultimately, the particular foreign constitution.
As South African Constitutional Court Justice Kriegler in Bernstein v. Bester66 main-
tained, ‘[f]ar too often one sees citation by counsel of, for instance, an American
judgment in support of a proposition relating to our Constitution, without any attempt
to explain why it is said to be in point. Comparative study is always useful, particularly
where Courts in exemplary jurisdictions have grappled with universal issues confronting
us. . . . But that is a far cry from blithe adoption of alien concepts or inappropriate
precedents.’67 Meanwhile, it is significant that recourse to judicial decisions from
common law jurisdictions that are predominantly inhabited by non-Caucasians, such
as most of the Caribbean countries, India, Malaysia and Singapore, and the mixed
legal system that is South Africa’s (whose constitutional jurisprudence is particularly
rich and discerning) is rarely seen in a Hong Kong court judgment. In the process,
foreign laws and judicial decisions may become part of the law of Hong Kong
without going through and satisfying Hong Kong’s legislature and legislative procedures
(however undemocratic they may be – two wrongs do not make a right), while Chinese
national laws in order to become part of the law of Hong Kong must be added to Annex
III to the Basic Law of Hong Kong through an elaborate and politically controversial
procedure.68
Chan has sought to explicate such incoherence on the grounds that foreign legal
materials from non-Caucasian common law jurisdictions are inaccessible, unfamiliar to
lawyers and judges trained in the common law, and difficult to be extrapolated into
Hong Kong’s legal system.69 However, the inaccessibility or unfamiliarity of particular
foreign legal materials is not sufficient or normative justification for their exclusion or
for Hong Kong courts’ incoherent and unprincipled approach, and Caribbean, Indian,
Malaysian, Singaporean and South African legal materials are no more inaccessible than
those from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and, indeed, England and Wales. Legal
materials from the Caribbean countries, India, Malaysia, Singapore and South Africa
also are no more unfamiliar to a Hong Kong lawyer or judge than the vast and complex
jurisprudence that is the United States’, where criminal law and family law, to name but
two, are primarily matters for the 50 individual states constrained by specific federal
laws and regulations, and where federal constitutional oversight must accord the state
constitutions and laws of the 50 states deference if not exclusivity and is available and
prescribed only where specific criteria and procedures are met. Lastly, the nature of
things dictates that all foreign legal materials, including English legal materials, must
suffer some difficulty in being extrapolated into another legal system.
Indeed, one must ask, why is it so alarming and adverse to Hong Kong’s judicial and
political autonomy if and when a provision of the Basic Law of Hong Kong, a Chinese
national law that derives authority from Article 31 of the Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China, is interpreted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress – a legislative body of China of which Hong Kong now forms a part – or if
and when a Chinese law is adopted in Hong Kong through amendment to Annex III to
the Basic Law of Hong Kong, when all the while recourse to foreign and international
legal materials, including in particular English judicial decisions, is taken as good
wisdom, good practice and general enhancement of Hong Kong’s laws and legal
system? One may argue that as Hong Kong continues to operate under a common law
legal system and with recourse to judicial decisions from other common law jurisdictions
being a chief characteristic of the common law tradition, it is only natural that Hong Kong
314 P.C.W. Chan
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courts make use of jurisprudence and legal materials from other common law jurisdic-
tions. The argument, however, implies that common law jurisdictions operate as a
league or under a general umbrella, which is certainly not the case, and it overlooks
a fact of great juridical importance: it is Hong Kong common law – common law is
devoid of meaning if not aligned with a particular locus – under which Hong Kong
is governed. It also ought to be noted that the common law legal system, implanted in
if not imposed upon Hong Kong by the British, is favourably regarded by the local popu-
lation, with ‘common law’ sometimes used as a demonstration slogan and synonym of
Hong Kong’s autonomy, primarily because China adopts the civil law legal system and
anything China adopts must be inferior if not simply dangerous. Sin Wai Man and Chu
Yiu Wai argue that Hong Kong courts’ unquestioned recourse to foreign judicial decisions
stems from a desire for ‘linkage with the ideal Occident’ – ideal in the sense that the laws
and judicial reasoning adopted by Western countries must be flawless and must be pre-
ferred to those that originate locally – ‘portrayed as so important that firstly the
application of the standards of the Occident to local situations is viewed as unproble-
matic, and, secondly, the possibility of the development of a locally based common
law is perceived as unimportant’.70 Hong Kong courts’ unquestioned recourse to
foreign and international legal materials, this paper argues, is diminutive not only of
China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong, but also of Hong Kong’s autonomy over itself.
Indeed, as will be seen, in Ng Kung Siu v. HKSAR, a case that concerned freedom of
expression, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal did not hesitate to premise its unani-
mous and concurring judgments on the basis of judicial decisions, legislation and quasi-
legal materials from various civil law jurisdictions ranging from Germany, Italy, Japan,
Norway to Portugal, and to completely ignore United States jurisprudence which
places freedom of expression in a sacrosanct position in the American legal system
and the American psyche.
Thus, constitutional comparativism as has been practised in Hong Kong suffers want of
objectivity, consistency and principle, as judges and lawyers rely on their own choosing
as to which jurisdictions to make use of in a particular case, and neglect or dismiss those
jurisdictions with which they are not familiar or are simply in disagreement. The danger
underlying such an approach lies not so much in the courts’ incomprehension of or
disagreement with foreign jurisdictions, as in the fact that the rule of law itself is thereby
placed in a vulnerable position, as judges may now engage in an unpredictable exercise
through which they self-select foreign laws and their meanings as part of the law of
Hong Kong. Anthony Lester argues that only cases that will directly and most benefit
one’s arguments should be cited to the court.71 Such an approach, with respect, derails
not only the normative determination of the particular issue and the particular case, but
also the normative development of the common law (again, Hong Kong common law)
and, ultimately, the rule of law in Hong Kong. As United States Supreme Court Justice
Scalia in Roper v. Simmons72 maintained, ‘[t]o invoke alien law when it agrees with
one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-making, but
sophistry.’73
This paper now explores how the problem revealed itself in two specific Hong Kong
human rights cases, namely, Ng Kung Siu v. HKSAR and Leung T.C. William Roy
v. Secretary for Justice. The two decisions are chosen as they illustrate how
constitutional comparativism as has been practised in Hong Kong may be capable of
both undermining and augmenting the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Basic Law of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance,
and in both instances the Hong Kong courts’ approaches were problematic.
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Ng Kung Siu v. HKSAR
Ng Kung Siu v.HKSAR concerned the criminalisation of desecration of the Chinese national
and Hong Kong regional flags in Hong Kong notwithstanding freedom of expression. As
Raymond Wacks has noted, ‘[a] country’s flag is a potent emblem of its nationhood. It
therefore evokes both reverence and, for those who oppose the state’s policies, abhorrence.
For the latter of course it provides a graphic demonstration of protest. A picture of a burning
flag is worth a thousand words – especially on the evening news.’74 In their political dem-
onstration against the lack of democracy in China and in Hong Kong, the two appellants in
the case marked the Chinese national and Hong Kong regional flags with ‘shame’ promi-
nently in Chinese characters.75 They were convicted of desecrating the Chinese national
flag and the Hong Kong regional flag by publicly and wilfully defiling them, contrary to
section 7 of the National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance76 and section 7 of the
Regional Flag and Regional Emblem Ordinance.77 The appellants, each sentenced to be
bound over to keep the peace in his own recognisance for a period of 12 months, appealed
their convictions, arguing that the provisions were inconsistent with their freedom of
expression guaranteed by Article 19 of the ICCPR78 and thus with Article 39 of the
Basic Law of Hong Kong which guarantees the continued application of the Covenant in
post-colonial Hong Kong (arguments on Article 27 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong79
and Article 16 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance,80 both of which guarantee
freedom of expression as a Hong Kong freedom, were nonetheless not raised). The govern-
ment, in reply, argued that restriction on freedom of expression may be justified for the pro-
tection of public order, and that it was in this case. It was noted that no violence occurred in
the course of the appellants’ political demonstration.81
The Hong Kong Court of Appeal allowed their appeals that had been directed from the
Hong Kong Court of First Instance. In its brief unanimous judgment, two United States
authorities on freedom of expression under the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, Texas v. Johnson82 and United States v. Eichman,83 where the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the criminalisation of desecration of the United States national
flag was inconsistent with the First Amendment, were the only judicial authorities referred
to, and relied upon, substantively.84 The court also accepted the argument of the defence
that ‘none of the leading common law jurisdictions criminalise the defacing of the national
flag’.85
The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal unanimously disagreed. The court found that the
criminalisation of desecration of the Chinese national and Hong Kong regional flags in
Hong Kong ‘is not a wide restriction of the freedom of expression. It is a limited one. It
bans one mode of expressing whatever the message the person concerned may wish to
express, that is the mode of desecrating the flags. It does not interfere with the person’s
freedom to express the same message by other modes.’86 (Does freedom of expression
not encompass freedom to choose the expression and how?)
Interestingly, in its unanimous judgment the court entirely cast aside United States
jurisprudence in allowing the government’s appeal and restoring the convictions of the
appellants, despite the sacrosanct importance of freedom of expression in the American
legal system which the Hong Kong Court of Appeal had acknowledged. Instead, the
court referred only to one foreign decision, an advisory opinion by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights under the American Convention on Human Rights,87 on the
meaning of ‘laws’ in the context of restrictions on rights and freedoms.88
Justice Bokhary in his concurring opinion was less reserved. His Lordship first referred
to the Australian High Court decision in Levy v. Victoria89 – the circumstances of which
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His Lordship admitted were different, as the Australian court ruled that restrictions on the
appellant’s entry into a duck-shooting area in order to protest against laws permitting the
shooting of birds and the illegal shooting of protected species did not contravene
freedom of expression – to support his view that the criminalisation of desecration of
the Chinese national and Hong Kong regional flags in Hong Kong affected only the
mode and not the substance of freedom of expression.90 His Lordship then addressed
the question of which foreign judicial decisions should not be followed, and they were,
no less, the two United States Supreme Court decisions in Texas v. Johnson and United
States v. Eichman which the Hong Kong Court of Appeal had found dispositive of the
issue and which the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in its unanimous judgment entirely
ignored. Justice Bokhary found that neither of the American decisions was unanimously
decided as each was decided by a bare majority of five to four91 (which, itself, showed
unfamiliarity with United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, that many cases before it
were decided by a five-to-four majority). Adamant that laws criminalising desecration of
the Chinese national and Hong Kong regional flags in Hong Kong were not incompatible
with freedom of expression and the ICCPR, ipso facto because many jurisdictions that were
signatories to the Covenant also had such laws, His Lordship discerned that instead of
the two American authorities, Hong Kong courts should look to decisions ‘upholding the
constitutionality of laws which protect the national flag and render breaches punishable’.92
His Lordship found a German decision and an Italian one to be particularly useful, as both
Germany and Italy were signatories to the ICCPR and their laws criminalising desecration
of the national flag were upheld by Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court and Italy’s
Supreme Court of Cassation, although their relevant contexts, laws or judicial reasoning
were not at all examined in Justice Bokhary’s concurring opinion.93 His Lordship indicated
that further guidance may be obtained by looking at Norway, ‘about which we have been
supplied information’94 and which, according to His Lordship, had no law criminalising
desecration of the Norwegian national flag but one criminalising public insult to foreign
flags,95 which His Lordship found to be the same in Japan.96 Lastly, His Lordship relied
on a letter of the Procurator-General of Portugal on the relevant law of Portugal pointing
to criminalisation.97 His Lordship took comfort in the fact that the Portuguese law
‘[appeared] to criminalize a considerable number of things which our own flag and
emblem protection laws do not criminalize’.98 Thus, His Lordship concluded, the crimina-
lisation of desecration of the Chinese national and Hong Kong regional flags in Hong Kong
was not inconsistent with freedom of expression, particularly as ‘the only restriction placed
is against the desecration of objects which hardly anyone would dream of desecrating even
if there was no law against it’99 – which was patently untrue, for otherwise there would
have been no need for such legislative provisions to be enacted so urgently by the Provi-
sional Legislative Council of Hong Kong, the formation of which was itself a constitutional
controversy,100 or for the prosecutions in question. It is also precisely the meaning of
freedom of expression that one may choose to not desecrate the Chinese national and
Hong Kong regional flags.
Why should Hong Kong laws on a matter that threatened freedom of expression in the
infancy of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and its ultimate rule by China, a
country known to suppress such a freedom, reflect the particular opinions of the Germans,
Italians, Norwegians, Japanese and Portuguese, and not the vast and vigorous jurisprudence
of the United States? What did the other 180 or so countries have to say about their national
flags? Also, it could not have escaped Justice Bokhary’s attention that Germany, Italy,
Norway, Japan and Portugal are all civil law and not common law jurisdictions. As His
Lordship referred to Norway and Japan on their criminalisation of desecration of foreign
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flags but not of national flags, Justice Bokhary failed to explain why that was the case. As
for the Portuguese law supported by a letter of the Procurator-General of Portugal, the fact
that it was more wide-ranging in its criminalisation of desecration of the national flag did
not at all answer and was wholly irrelevant to the constitutionality of the criminalisation in
Hong Kong. Furthermore, the notion that just because a country is a signatory to the ICCPR
its laws must be compatible with it rids violation of an international human rights treaty of
its very meaning. Lastly, even if German, Italian, Norwegian, Japanese and Portuguese laws
on the matter were compatible with the ICCPR, Hong Kong courts must, and failed to,
explain why and how similar Hong Kong laws were equally reconcilable, as symmetry in
dissimilar contexts may and does lead to dissimilar outcomes.
Instead of following a handful of foreign laws and judicial decisions (let alone quasi-
legal materials) without proper inquiry as to why they were chosen and why others were
not, and why and how they might be relevant in justifying the criminalisation of desecration
of the Chinese national and Hong Kong regional flags within the confines of freedom of
expression in Hong Kong, Hong Kong courts ought to have engaged in their own analysis
as to why, as a matter of Hong Kong law, such criminalisation was justified in Hong Kong,
particularly given Hong Kong’s unique circumstances as a special administrative region of
China and, against this context, its legislative and (China’s) treaty commitments to freedom
of expression. The courts may, indeed must, explain why and how particular foreign and
international legal materials may and may not be relevant, and explore whether those par-
ticular foreign and international legal materials were indicative of a normative consensus or
constituted persuasive reasoning. Finally, the courts ought to have taken the opportunity to
elucidate judicially whether and how the ICCPR may continue to have an impact on Hong
Kong laws as a result of Article 39 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong which guarantees the
continued application of the Covenant in post-colonial Hong Kong.
Leung T.C. William Roy v. Secretary for Justice
Leung T.C. William Roy v. Secretary for Justice was an application for judicial review
challenging the higher age of consent for male/male sexual activity in the light of an indi-
vidual’s right of equality and his right to privacy. The applicant, a 20-year-old man self-
identified as a homosexual since puberty, alleged that sections 118C,101 118F(2)(a),102
118H103 and 118J(2)(a)104 of the Crimes Ordinance discriminatorily impinged upon his ability
to form and develop a mutually consensual and loving relationship with another man as
he was subjected to the threat of criminal prosecution and imprisonment for expressing
his affection through sexual intimacy and intercourse.105 Thus, although hitherto not
the subject of any criminal prosecution,106 the applicant argued that the continuing exist-
ence of the four legislative provisions violated his right to privacy under Article 29 of
the Basic Law of Hong Kong and Article 14 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance
and constituted discrimination against him on grounds of sexual orientation in violation
of his right of equality under Article 25 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong and Article 22
of the Ordinance.107
After concluding that the act of buggery between males was a form of sexual inter-
course108 and elucidating the equality guarantees in Hong Kong,109 the Hong Kong
Court of First Instance stated that ‘[t]here can be no doubt that gay men have been histori-
cally disadvantaged by being perceived to belong to a group marked by stereotyped
capacities. The Nazis, for example, had no difficulty in recognising homosexuals as a
class, the status being bestowed in order to degrade them as a class. Much of our human
rights jurisprudence today springs from the need to protect against such discrimination.’110
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The court referred to the views of the United Nations Human Rights Committee in Toonen
v. Australia111 and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Salguiero da
Silva Mouta v. Portugal, where it was concluded, respectively, that Articles 2(1) and 26 of
the ICCPR and Article 14 of the ECHR protected an individual against discrimination on
grounds of sexual orientation. The court, thus, held that Article 22 of the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights Ordinance similarly protected against discrimination on grounds of sexual orien-
tation.112 In establishing jurisdiction over the matter, the court took note of the Hong
Kong Court of Final Appeal decision in Ng Ka Ling, where the highest court stated that
as ‘a matter of obligation, not of discretion’ the judiciary must examine whether a particular
legislative provision in Hong Kong alleged to violate a fundamental right or freedom was
compatible with the Basic Law of Hong Kong or the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance
and, if not, to have it declared unconstitutional and invalid to the extent of its inconsis-
tency,113 and referred to Article 35(1) of the Basic Law of Hong Kong which states that
‘Hong Kong residents shall have the right to . . . access to the courts . . . for timely protection
of their lawful rights and interests . . . and to judicial remedies.’114 Interestingly, instead of
referring to the European Court of Human Rights decision in Norris v. Ireland115 as the
Hong Kong Court of Appeal subsequently did,116 the court referred to the decision of
the European Court of Justice in Union de Pequerios Agricultores v. Council of the Euro-
pean Union,117 alongside a number of English, one Canadian and one South African
decisions on the general nature of judicial review,118 to conclude that the continuing exist-
ence of the four legislative provisions under challenge and their continuing effect on the
applicant was sufficient to enable him to have the necessary locus standi to challenge the
provisions and have his application for judicial review entertained.119
As the government conceded the unconstitutionality of sections 118F(2)(a), 118H and
118J(2)(a) of the Crimes Ordinance,120 the court indicated that ‘it is important, in my
opinion, to have regard not to each of the sections challenged by the applicant in isolation
but instead to view them together as a legislative scheme’.121 In finding that section 118C
discriminatorily targeted gay men and infringed their right of equality, the court relied122
particularly on the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in R. v. M. (C.).123 The Hong Kong
court also relied on the European Commission of Human Rights decision in Sutherland
v. United Kingdom124 (although it mistook the decision as ‘a watershed case in the Euro-
pean Community’125 which should in fact be the Council of Europe) and held that
‘[d]enying persons of a minority class the right to sexual expression in the only way avail-
able to them, even if that way is denied to all, remains discriminatory when persons of a
majority class are permitted the right to sexual expression in a way natural to them.
During the course of submissions, it was described as “disguised discrimination”. It is, I
think, an apt description. It is disguised discrimination founded on a single base: sexual
orientation.’126 Thus, the court held, the four provisions of the Crimes Ordinance under
challenge constituted grave and continuing interference with the applicant’s private life
and violated his right of equality.127 In September 2006, the Hong Kong Court of
Appeal unanimously upheld the judgment of the Hong Kong Court of First Instance.128
The government did not lodge a further appeal to the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal
within the prescribed time limit. However, although invalidated by the courts, the four
provisions of the Crimes Ordinance have not yet been repealed by legislature and continue
to remain on the statute book.
While it is commendable that both the Hong Kong Court of First Instance and the Hong
Kong Court of Appeal embraced constitutional protection of equality in Hong Kong on
grounds of sexual orientation, it must be pointed out that while the courts relied on
Canadian and European judicial decisions, they failed to take cognisance of the laws and
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judicial decisions of more than 100 jurisdictions that condemned consensual same-sex sexual
activity (Iran to public hanging and Saudi Arabia to public decapitation). As Alford argues:
If at its bottom [constitutional comparativism] is a process-oriented approach, it will sacrifice
core individual rights for the sake of thoroughgoing comparative methodology. . . . If on the
other hand, a comparative theory is at its essence a substantive ideal, it must illuminate the
selective nature of that ideal. That is, it must explain why certain universally recognized
norms are constitutionally cognizable, while other foreign practices that are less solicitous
to individual rights are not. If international norms are the substantive ideal without such
distinctions, then a convincing case must be made not only for internalizing those norms
to enhance individual rights, but also for internalizing those norms to diminish certain rights
that are currently enjoyed at an enhanced level. . .129
In particular, as the government referred to the case of Zimbabwe and a decision of the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe to support its argument that the judiciary should defer to the
legislature in matters of social policy, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance merely noted
that no evidence was laid to demonstrate ‘what today – if it can be ascertained – is the pre-
vailing view of the Hong Kong community towards matters of homosexual activity carried
out consensually and in private. In a cosmopolitan society like Hong Kong “social norms
and values” change, often rapidly.’130 Was the court suggesting then that if the Hong Kong
community did predominantly view homosexuality and sexual minorities along the same
lines as Zimbabweans (or, more accurately, what the Zimbabwean government purported
to be the Zimbabwean view131), the applicant’s constitutional right of equality and his
constitutional right to privacy under the Basic Law of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance should no longer be protected? The court, this paper argues,
ought to have explained whether and why, as a matter of Hong Kong law, protection pro-
vided for in the Basic Law of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance
against discrimination must encompass protection against sexual orientation discrimination
irrespective of the views of the Hong Kong general public. Instead, what the court was
saying amounted in essence to this: ‘We have no idea what Hong Kong people think,
and frankly we don’t care, as we must agree with the Canadians and Europeans (and
ignore the Zimbabweans, who are just not quite the same as us to warrant our attention).’
With English courts out of the picture (the issue was decided by Parliament in Westmin-
ster through legislation in 2000 and 2003132), why, one ought to ask, should an Ontario
appellate court decision (R. v. M. (C.)), which did not receive subsequent scrutiny by the
Supreme Court of Canada, on a provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
which unlike the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance is not premised upon and does not
purport to implement the ICCPR, a European Court of Human Rights decision under the
ECHR (Salguiero da Silva Mouta) to which Hong Kong was not a party, or a European
Commission of Human Rights decision under the ECHR which was subsequently settled
out of court (Sutherland) carry such influential, in this case determinative, weight in,
indeed over, Hong Kong judicial reasoning? Either out of pure overlooking or in order
to avoid having to engage in a similar vigorous debate and face similar criticism in terms
of comparative methodology, both Hong Kong courts sidestepped a discussion of the
United States Supreme Court case of Lawrence v. Texas133 decided (by a 6–3 majority)
only two years before. In addition, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance’s reliance on a
decision by the European Court of Justice which is not based on and does not enforce a
human rights treaty but a series of treaties aiming solely at European economic integration
(even if the European Union has subsequently encompassed a broader political integration
‘founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
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freedoms, and the rule of law’134) – notwithstanding the availability of more suitable auth-
orities such as the European Court of Human Rights decision in Norris v. Ireland that over
almost identical facts and arguments held in favour of jurisdiction – evidenced only too
clearly Hong Kong courts’ incoherent and unprincipled, if not also uninformed, approach
to foreign and international legal materials when interpreting the Basic Law of Hong Kong
and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. Last but not least, considering the pervasive
disdain in Hong Kong for Chinese laws, for reasons noted above, it was not surprising that
neither the Hong Kong Court of First Instance nor the Hong Kong Court of Appeal exam-
ined the legal status in China of homosexuality and equality and privacy rights in the
context of sexual orientation – which, considering that in China there were no laws at
all against homosexuality,135 might well have been dispositive of the case summarily in
favour of the applicant.
Again, instead of blindly following self-selected foreign and international legal
materials, the Hong Kong courts ought to have engaged in their own analysis as to why,
as a matter of Hong Kong law, protection against discrimination in Hong Kong must
encompass protection against sexual orientation discrimination, and why and how particu-
lar foreign and international legal materials may and may not be relevant. As part of sound
constitutional comparativism and judicial reasoning, the courts must provide reasons, under
and in the context of Hong Kong laws, for their reflexive application of laws and judicial
decisions of Western countries and their reflexive neglect or dismissal of legal materials
from countries such as Zimbabwe. Finally, of course, the courts ought to have explored
the disparity between Hong Kong and Chinese laws in respect of consensual male/male
sexual activity to discern whether and how colonial laws against an individual on the
basis of sexual orientation now stood in post-colonial Hong Kong. As Michael Ramsey
maintains, if the ultimate commonality among different jurisdictions lies not in the
interpretation of constitutional texts but in the determination of whether criminalisation
of or a discriminatory age of consent for consensual same-sex sexual activity is morally
and socially justifiable, then ‘the intuitive authority of the [European Court of Human
Rights], as compared to billions of individuals and entities worldwide that might also
have a philosophical opinion on the matter, is greatly diminished. The [European Court
of Human Rights], as a court, may be of persuasive source of legal reasoning, but it is
not necessarily a better moral and social decision maker than the multitude whose opinions
we are not invited to study.’136 The argument that jurisprudence from developing countries
carries less value in an affluent and cosmopolitan jurisdiction such as Hong Kong is juris-
prudentially unsound, as ‘this seems to revive the discredited nineteenth-century concept of
“civilized” and “uncivilized” nations, and subconsciously to endorse a Eurocentrism that
would be indefensible if argued overtly’.137 Indeed, without even the most basic civil
right of universal suffrage, by which even the government of such a politically and econ-
omically unstable jurisdiction as Zimbabwe is formally elected, is Hong Kong really so
developed?
Conclusion
This paper does not agree with Lord Woolf’s or Justice Waung’s wholesale dismissal of
constitutional comparativism in the interpretation of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordi-
nance and, by extension, the Basic Law of Hong Kong, as constitutional comparativism
has its intrinsic values and advantages. In particular, constitutional comparativism offers
Hong Kong courts and jurists, as well as the Hong Kong people and government, informed
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reflection on and understanding of Hong Kong laws and society and how post-colonial
Hong Kong’s legal, political and social systems may proceed.
However, this paper also does not agree with Hong Kong courts’ approach hitherto to
constitutional comparativism. Indeed, it is a cause for worry that Hong Kong courts’
recourse to foreign and international legal materials – in particular their almost automatic
application of English judicial decisions – is incoherent and unprincipled. Furthermore, the
fact that an English court must now take into account ECHR jurisprudence in its decision
when an ECHR right is involved138 means that a Hong Kong court may on one occasion
rely on an English judicial decision because it was enlightened by ECHR jurisprudence
and yet on another occasion refuse to follow an English judicial decision because it was
tainted by jurisprudence under a treaty by which Hong Kong has never been bound. As
a result, Hong Kong laws are rendered unpredictable, and the rule of law in Hong Kong
undermined. It is trite to say that ‘[a] constitutional theory that advances the rule of law pro-
motes legal certainty, efficacy, stability, supremacy, and impartiality.’139 Richard Posner, a
judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, warns extra-judicially
of constitutional comparativism as it invites individual judges to ‘troll deeply in the world’s
corpus juris’ which they may then use to support an essentially politically desired or other-
wise pre-determined outcome.140 Such an approach does not advance the rule of law or pro-
tection of fundamental rights and freedoms, for ‘[a] comparative theory must be able to
make the case as to why its preferred set of rights are superior to other sets of rights, and
the theory must do so consonant with political democracy and the rule of law.’141 Other-
wise, all sets of rights, depending on the views of particular judges and their choice of
foreign authorities, will be at risk, at any time, of disfavour and demise.
Perhaps Hong Kong courts may desire to (be seen to) lay the same kind of emphasis as
United States Supreme Court Justice O’Connor did on a ‘good impression’, that recourse to
foreign and international legal materials ‘may not only enrich our own country’s decisions; it
will create that all-important good impression.When [HongKong] courts are seen to be cog-
nizant of other judicial systems, our ability to act as a rule-of-law model for other nations
[(read: China)] will be enhanced.’142 While it is understandable that Hong Kong courts
may endeavour to show to the Hong Kong people and overseas audiences that, despite
the transfer of sovereignty, they remain an independent and enlightened judiciary that
observes and guarantees the rule of law in Hong Kong, the irony is that by seeking to
give such a ‘good impression’ through incoherent and unprincipled recourse to foreign
and international legal materials, they are undermining the rule of law in Hong Kong.
While it is equally understandable that Hong Kong courts may endeavour to differentiate
Hong Kong’s laws and legal system as much as possible from those of China in order to
avoid the ultimate amalgamation (including amalgamation in appearance) between Hong
Kong and Chinese laws and legal systems, recourse to foreign and international legal
materials without proper inquiry and only on the supposed basis that they enlighten Hong
Kong laws simpliciter is not justified. Such recourse is diminutive not only of China’s sover-
eignty over Hong Kong, but also of Hong Kong’s autonomy over itself.
‘[T]he most constructive use of comparative constitutional law’, Seth Kreimer discerns,
‘is not as an alternative store of constitutional software, but a challenge to us to reexamine
the resources in our own system.’143 As Justice O’Connor in the United States Supreme
Court case of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey144 maintained,
‘[t]he Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that
shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the
Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands. . . . the Court’s legitimacy depends
on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled
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character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.’145 As time goes on and as
China continues to influence Hong Kong thinking (it would be naı¨ve to think that it is not
doing so), Hong Kong courts in the future may well decide to resort to constitutional com-
parativism against protection of fundamental rights and freedoms in Hong Kong – if they
have not already done so (as in Ng Kung Siu). Constitutional comparativism as has been
practised in Hong Kong, thus, ‘threatens to undermine the integrity of both constitutional
law and comparative law’146 in Hong Kong.
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